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Abstract
This article examines sectoral MERCOSUR exports to the EU in the period of 1988 to 1996. A sectoral
study is considered indispensable since tariff and non-tariff trade barriers vary strongly among sectors.
The empirical investigation is based on both a dynamic panel analysis and a rather qualitative
evaluation of the extent of tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by the EU. The ex-post analysis for the
period of 1988 to 1996 revealed three things: First, a more competitive real exchange rate could
contribute to a better MERCOSUR export performance. Second, EU protection has had in general a
very negative impact on MERCOSUR export growth rates. Third, EU protection strongly affected
MERCOSUR's largest export sectors.




The Latin American countries have a long history of trade with European countries. In
the period of 1988 to 1996 MERCOSUR's main trading partner was the European
Union (EU), followed by the U.S.A. The strength of MERCOSUR's export sectors was
quite heterogeneous in this time lapse. Export strength, as measured by sectoral
export shares and sectoral growth rates, varied widely from sector to sector.
1 Total
exports from the MERCOSUR to the EU and the U.S.A. grew very slowly, but at
similar rates. According to OECD trade data, the growth of exports to the EU stood at
an annual rate of 1.61 percent, whereas total exports to the U.S.A. expanded at a
slightly higher rate, namely 1.90 per cent.
However, since 1994 exports to the U.S.A. have been more stable and yielded
continuously positive annual growth rates. Since then it is fair to say that the
orientation of MERCOSUR countries' exports towards the US-market has increased,
whereas MERCOSUR's exports to the EU have lost ground. Several factors
influenced this development: Trade talks between the U.S.A. and the MERCOSUR,
better market access in general to the US market and a more dynamic and faster
growing US economy.
                                               
1 The growth rates of sectoral exports can be very different from total export growth! Especially very
small sectors grew tremendously in the period under study, but obtained only very small weights in the
calculation of the growth rates of TOTAL exports. Exports were measured in current US$.4
As far as trade talks between the U.S.A. and the MERCOSUR are concerned, there
were intensive talks about 'Free Trade in the Americas' at the Summit of the
Americas in 1994. The objective was to integrate the economies of the Western
Hemisphere into a single free trade arrangement (FTAA). It has to be admitted that
from today's point of view there remains a long way to go to reach this goal.
In contrast to this development, the EU apparently started trade negotiations with the
MERCOSUR only in reaction to the ongoing talks and negotiations between the
U.S.A. and Latin American countries. In 1995 the EU and the MERCOSUR signed an
Interregional Framework Agreement aimed at fostering economic co-operation and
closer trade relations, with the ambitious objective of reaching a Free Trade
Agreement in 2005. Up to now the talks, which are necessary for preparing such a
Free Trade Agreement, have not been substantive.
Another reason for the strengthening of MERCOSUR's exports to the U.S.A. is a
relatively better access to US agricultural markets. The EU is renowned for having
the highest level of protection (after Japan) with respect to agricultural products. The
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU disposes of a huge budget which is
partly used to limit agricultural imports.
Furthermore, the US economy grew on average faster than the EU economies in the
last two decades, thus generating more demand for MERCOSUR's exports. The
export growth of income-elastic products is dependent on fast growing markets of
potential importers.
Nonetheless, the MERCOSUR countries have a vital interest in good trade relations
with the EU and the EU is also eager not to lose the Latin American market which is
interesting as an export market for goods and services and as a platform for
investment.
In this study, past and future MERCOSUR-EU trade relations will be evaluated.
MERCOSUR's past exports to the EU under the protectionist environment of the
period of 1988 to 1996 will be examined and an attempt will be made to determine
MERCOSUR's exports' growth potential in the EU market.
2 Five countries will be
investigated, the four formal members of the MERCOSUR: Argentina (AR), Brazil
(BR), Paraguay (PY) and Uruguay (UR), and Chile (CH), which became an
                                               
2 The MERCOSUR countries have a dominant net export position as far as agricultural trade is
concerned. They dominate temperate export products (Valdés, 2002).5
associated MERCOSUR country in 1996. Bolivia, which signed an association
agreement with the MERCOSUR in 1995, was not sampled due to incomplete OECD
data and due to its small economic size: Chile's contribution to MERCOSUR exports
was 18.3% in 1996, whereas Bolivia's share was 1.3% in the same year.
The sample period for which OECD export data are used runs from 1988 to 1996.
The investigation is performed on a sectoral level (69 sectors, SITC Revision 2). The
empirical investigation is based on a dynamic panel analysis. A sectoral study is
considered indispensable since tariff and non-tariff trade barriers vary strongly among
sectors. In this investigation emphasis is put both on an analysis on the general real
exchange rate elasticity of each single sector and its dependence on the European
business cycle, and a rather qualitative evaluation of the extent of tariff and non-tariff
barriers imposed by the EU.
For this purpose, it is necessary to identify those sectors which are affected most by
changes of the exchange rate and international differentials in the inflation rate, the
business cycle, and trade barriers. It is assumed that sectors which react in a price
elastic way will be hindered by an unstable, appreciated real exchange rate. They will
be impeded also by tariff-barriers that have an impact on relative prices (tariffs and
subsidies)
3. It is further assumed that sectors which depend strongly on the business
cycle of the European importers will suffer from a recession and profit from a boom in
the EU. Finally, it is suggested that sectors which are harmed by trade barriers
should strive for a free trade agreement with the EU even though it will be difficult to
be reached.
The paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 a short overview of the EU
and MERCOSUR is given. Section 3 contains an empirical study on the reaction of
MERCOSUR's exports with respect to changes in real exchange rate and EU's
business cycle. The trade barriers imposed by the EU are described in Section 4. Not
only will mention be made of the type of the trade barriers and the sectors affected,
but also of the importance of these sectors in the respective MERCOSUR countries.
Finally, Section 5 presents an outlook and the conclusions.
                                               
3 Technical trade barriers probably affect more the access itself and quality aspects of the product.6
2.Development and perspectives of the MERCOSUR-EU trade 
agreement
A very recent example of North-South integration is the EU-MERCOSUR trade
agreement. The first negotiations leading to this agreement started in 1995, with the
signing of an Interregional Framework Agreement aimed at fostering economic co-
operation and closer trade relations between the two regional blocs. A further
objective was the creation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2005. Until June
2001, the exchanges developed in the agreement framework consisted in gathering
information and laying the grounds for future negotiations. Concrete negotiations only
began in 2001, when questions related to tariffs and services started to be discussed.
Tough negotiations are to be expected for agricultural products (sugar, cereals, milk,
and meat), for textiles and for leather products, as well as for industrial products
(steel, ferroalloys, aluminium and other metals, fertilisers, chemicals, potash, plastics,
PVC and synthetic rubber).
On the side of the EU, incentives to engage in substantive negotiations with
MERCOSUR will depend closely on the consolidation and progress of the
MERCOSUR as a Customs Union. On the side of MERCOSUR, market access,
trade expansion, international bargaining and credibility considerations are incentives
playing a major role to engage in FTA negotiations with the EU.
MERCOSUR has surely a shorter history than the EU. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay signed the MERCOSUR agreement in 1991 and it went into effect in
1995 becoming a Customs Union. Following the entry into force of the Common
External Tariff on January 1, 1995, the MERCOSUR countries must maintain a
common commercial policy. Bolivia and Chile are associated countries of the
MERCOSUR without full membership status. Bolivia and Chile signed the association
agreements with MERCOSUR in 1995 and 1996 respectively. MERCOSUR has also
been trying to promote Chile's
4 full membership and inclusion into the MERCOSUR-
customs union in 2000. A point of concern for Chile was the fact that Chile's import
tariffs were much lower than MERCOSUR's average external tariff. Chile's average
                                               
4 However, the MERCOSUR countries took offence at Chile's sudden disinterest in full membership at
the end of 2000 and at her bilateral negotiations with the U.S.A. about a FTA. Cardoso, Brazil's
president and MERCOSUR's chairman at that time, finally suspended further talks with Chile in
December 2000.7
import tariff is 9 per cent (to be lowered to 6 per cent in 2003) and MERCOSUR's
common external tariff is 13% (Lateinamerika Jahrbuch 2001, 2001).
There is a shared consensus that since its inception MERCOSUR outperformed
expectations. This shows up in part by the rapidly growing trade and investment
flows. In fact, between 1991 and 1997 intra-MERCOSUR exports rose at a rate that
trebled the growth of exports to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, if imports are
taken as the indicator, the gap between the growth rates of intra and extra-regional
trade flows is remarkably lower. This indicates no evidence of significant trade
diversion.
MERCOSUR is considered as an emerging market offering good investment
opportunities, with a population over two hundred million inhabitants (it represents
half of the population of Latin America and Caribbean). MERCOSUR has probably
more to gain by joining the EU in a FTA rather than negotiating with North America,
since MERCOSUR member countries already have relatively free access to the
North American market. A FTA with the EU, in contrast, will improve access to that
market and reduce its dependency on the U.S.A. (Panagariya, 1996).
However, the main question is whether the EU will be willing to make major
concessions in agricultural trade. Since agriculture and fishery make up about 2/5 of
MERCOSUR's total exports into the EU, this issue is of utmost importance for the
MERCOSUR countries (Nunnenkamp, 2001).
There have been several attempts to measure the effects on trade flows since the
formation of MERCOSUR (Yeats (1998), Diao and Somwaru (2000)), most of them
refer to aggregated trade flows and predict small net welfare gains for the country
members.
The authors' analysis will proceed in two analytical steps. First, in Section 3 the
influence of macroeconomic changes (exchange rates, inflation rates...) is to be
filtered out. Second, Section 4 has the objective to evaluate the EU's possible
negative contribution to MERCOSUR's export development.
3.MERCOSUR's exports and the macroeconomic environment
Before turning to externally imposed trade barriers and their impact on
MERCOSUR's exports, the importance of the macroeconomic environment for
MERCOSUR's exports must be investigated. MERCOSUR'S exports demanded by8
the EU are analysed on a sectoral level. Emphasis is laid on the role played by
relative prices (i.e. the influence of the exchange rate policy and the development of
price levels in the MERCOSUR countries and the EU) and the business cycle in the
EU.
According to Figure 1 the MERCOSUR countries, with the exception of Brazil;
experienced quite strong appreciations
5 of their real exchange rates (er_areu,
er_cheu, er_pyeu, er_ureu) in relation to the EU. The trend toward appreciation
began in 1989 as far as Argentina is concerned and in 1990 as far as Chile,
Paraguay and Uruguay are concerned.
Figure 1: Real exchange rate development vis-à-vis the EU
The objective of the country-regressions across sectors and across time is to
investigate two relevant issues. First, whether this real appreciation harmed the
exports of specific countries and sectors or whether a different exchange rate policy
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would have helped to promote MERCOSUR's exports. Second, how dependent
MERCOSUR's exports were from EU's business cycle.
In a separate study the potential impact of cuts in tariffs and subsidies accorded in
the Uruguay Round
6 will be analysed. In the present investigation changes in trade
policy are treated as constant since in the period under study there were no
remarkable changes in that respect.
The model to evaluate the macroeconomic impact, i. e. the impact of the real
exchange rate and the business cycle of the importing countries (EU) on export
demand is based on Goldstein and Khan (1978) and Nowak-Lehmann D. (1997). It
assumes imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign products. The model is
made dynamic by building in reaction lags, which are shaped as a geometric
lag/Koyck lag.
The model under investigation is of the following form:
Argentina:
(1)  lxarjt= c1 + c2*lerarit + c3*lymeut + c4*lxarjt-1
Brazil:
(2)  lxbrjt= c1 + c2*lerbrit + c3*lymeut + c4*lxbrjt-1
Chile:
(3)  lxchjt= c1 + c2*lerchit + c3*lymeut + c4*lxchjt-1
Paraguay:
(4)  lxpyjt= c1 + c2*lerpyit + c3*lymeut + c4*lxpyjt-1
Uruguay:
(5)  lxurjt= c1 + c2*lerurit + c3*lymeut + c4*lxurjt-1
with:
j = export sectors (j = 00,......., 97)
7
t = time (annual data; t = 1988, ...., 1996)
lx = exports in logs (in real terms)
8
lymeu = real income of the EU (trade weighted)
9
                                               
6 Stepwise cuts in tariffs and subsidies were decided from 1995 on. Transition phases of 6 years/10
years were granted for DCs' agricultural/textiles and clothing exports. However, there were no legal
obligations to enforce this agreement.
7 A maximum of 67 sectors appeared as export sectors.
8 The figures had to be approximated due to the unavailability of sectoral export deflators.
9 To keep the analysis simple this variable was assumed to be the same for each MERCOSUR
country.10
ler = real exchange rate in logs; it is assumed that tariffs and subsidies have not
changed in the period of 1988 to 1996 ( see WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW of the
EU, 1995):
In order to keep the model as simple as possible and to avoid the loss of degrees of
freedom, a standard pooled estimation is applied. No weighting is performed, a
common intercept is utilised and a common coefficient of the adjustment lag is
considered adequate. To derive the average
10 real exchange rate elasticity, a
common coefficient of 'leer_' is estimated. In analogy, the average business cycle
elasticity is derived by including a common coefficient on 'lymeu'.
Table 1, which summarises the results of the pooled analysis regressions for each
country, reveals that the assumption of adjustment lags was important for four
countries (with the exception of Paraguay). The adjustment coefficients carried the
expected right sign and were significant at  % 1 = a  for Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and
significant at  % 5 = a  for Chile. The model has a good explanatory power for all
countries under study. R
2 adjusted was between 81.1 and 94.1. The number of
sectors investigated varies in each country, since some countries, especially the
smaller countries, do not export in all categories.
Table 1 shows also that four countries (with exception of Brazil) dispose of a
significant positive real exchange rate elasticity (taking the average of 56 to 68
sectors). The majority of sectors in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay and about half
of the sectors in Chile show a significant positive reaction with respect to changes in
the real exchange rate. This means that in these countries appreciations of the real
exchange rate hurt the export sectors and depreciations of the real exchange rate
could improve the export performance. Therefore, one can conclude that exchange
rate policy in these countries could contribute to a better export performance.
                                               
10 i.e. across sectors.11



























































































As far as reactions of the business cycle are concerned, only three out of five
countries seem to be dependent on the economic business cycle in the EU. This
might be due to the high proportion of agricultural products in MERCOSUR exports.
Agricultural or agriculture-based exports are known to be income inelastic.
To sum up, the performance of MERCOSUR exports could be improved by means of
an exchange rate policy that manages the real exchange rate and maintains it at a
competitive level. However, it has to be acknowledged that this policy is not
considered acceptable in the MERCOSUR countries themselves. A shift towards an
increased processing of agricultural goods and towards the production of
                                               
ƒ *** = confidence level of 99%; ** = confidence level of 95%; * = confidence level of 90%12
manufactured goods
11 could strengthen the overall income-elasticity of MERCOSUR
exports and allow profiting from growth in the industrial countries.
This leads to the issue of whether other factors, i.e. external conditions, such as EU's
trade policy, impede MERCOSUR exports to grow and whether improvement of
market access to the EU countries should be given a top priority in MERCOSUR-EU
trade negotiations.
4.Extent and importance of trade barriers imposed on MERCOSUR 
exports
This section summarizes the trade barriers imposed by the EU on MERCOSUR
exports. The description proceeds from a very general to a more specific perspective.
According to an UNCTAD study by Supper (2001), developing countries continue to
face high trade barriers for their most important export products on their major export
markets. Although tariffs are now low or nil for many products, most of those
countries can hardly aspire to export in the foreseeable future.
As tariffs tend to decrease, protection tends to shift from tariffs to anti-dumping and
countervailing action, safeguards and informal market arrangements. Budget
subsidies still play a prominent role, being three times higher in agriculture than in
industry. Recent WTO Agreements try to cut back those governmental subsidies, but
leave ample room for many other subsidies mainly applied by developed countries.
4.1 Overview over EU trade barriers
First, the measures applied by the EU
12 will be described in general terms. With
respect to protection in agricultural trade by the European Union (EU) the main
measures imposed are of the subsidy type and can be extracted from Table 2. With
respect to the protection of industrial products the European Union also relies on
support measures which are specified in Table 3.
                                               
11 Martínez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann D. (2002) report some progress on this process. Linder
products increased their importance to the detriment of Hechscher-Ohlin products in the period of
1988 to 1996.
12 One has to bare in mind that other industrialized countries like the United States, Canada, Japan
use the same or similar measures. As far as developing countries are concerned they do not concede
free market access either, but they do not dispose of comparable budgets in order to finance
production, investment and export subsidies.13
Table 2: EU trade barriers in agriculture
General measures Detailed measures
Export subsidies Export refunds
Export assistance Quality promotion measures
Food aid
Price, income and marketing support Price and export subsidies, input support,
compensation for exchange rate changes, surplus
disposal programs, direct income support
Sanitary and phytosanitary support Veterinary and plant protection programs, support
against epizooties
Structural improvements and new investments Investment aids for farm modernization projects,
adjustment aids to reform agricultural and fishery
structures, compensatory payments per livestock
unit, subsidies for processing and marketing,
diversification, environment and infrastructure
improvements, retention of farmers and research
&technology development in agriculture and fishery
Environment protection Agri-environmental measures, afforestation
programs
Table 3: EU trade barriers in industrial goods trade
General measures Detailed measures
Production support measures Rationalization, modernization of existing
industries, reconversion, rescue & restructuring,
aid to SMEs for adjustment and modernization,
marketing aids, industrial competitiveness policy,
standarization, testing, employment support and
incentives for job creating investments
Investment support Investment financing, subsidies and tax
concessions, promotion of international joint
ventures, regional investment aids to new
industries, investment aids to SMEs (new
projects, expansion), research and development
(Community Research and Development
Framework Program
Export subsidies, export finance and export
promotion
Export credits, guarantees, export credit
insurance, tax allowances to export activities
Environmental and energy measures Nature protection programs, marine sciences and
technology program, grants for energy saving14
The EU provides export subsidies and support on a large scale to its agricultural and
livestock producers, as well as its food industry. Export refunds amounted to US$ 5.5
billion in 1997. The main beneficiary is the livestock and dairy sector with 80 per cent
of the total. Considerable export subsidies are also granted to cereals (US$ 620
million) and food industry products (US$ 650 million; see Supper, 2001).
Even though the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in
principle prohibits industrial export subsidies, which are contingent on export
performance, similar programmes intended to promote exports continue to play a
significant role in developed countries. According to OECD estimates, its member
States spend US$ 7.3 billion on such programmes (Supper, 2001).
4.2 EU most protected sectors
Not all sectors are affected by EU protection in the same way. In general protection
against agricultural products is much more pronounced than protection against
manufactured goods. Table 4 contains the sectors or products which face very high
or high non-tariff protection (column 3) and considerable tariff protection (column 4)
from the side of EU.
13
The determination of degree of protection is fact-based, but must contain subjective
elements. This is so because protection is not only achieved by the imposition of
import tariffs
14, but to a very large extent achieved by non-tariff measures NTBs
15.
Due to the existence and sometimes dominance of a multitude of non-tariff barriers, a
weighting scheme based on UNCTAD-information on NTBs (Supper, 2001) had to be
created. The information on tariffs comes from two sources. One is the UNCTAD
report written by Supper (2001) and other is WTO's Trade Policy Review of the EU of
1995, 1997 and 2000.
                                               
13 The sectors not mentioned show only low or no protection.
14 Import tariffs could be ranked easily.
15 NTBs cannot be quantified in a satisfying way because of a lack of information on their US-$ or
Euro amount concerning total trade and even sparser information on NTBs affecting MERCOSUR
trade.15
Table 4: EU most protected sectors
Cl Sectors affected by protection Degree of non-
tariff protection
Degree of tariff  protection (t=tariff)
ƒ
00 Live animals chiefly for food Very high t=18%
01 Meat and meat preparations Very high t=51%
02 Dairy products Very high t=52%
03 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, preparations
thereof
High t=12%
04 Cereals and cereal preparations Very high t=62%
05 Vegetables and fruit Very high Price dependent seasonal tariffs
 On average t=12%
06 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey Very high t=31%
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices High t=7%
08 Feeding stuff for animals High t=37%
09 Miscellaneous edible products and
preparations
Very high t=25%
11 Beverages, fruit juices High Price dependent tariffs;
Average t=25%
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures Low t=46%
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit High t=3%
25 Pulp and waste paper High
26 Textile fibres and their waste Very high t=12%
32 Coal, coke and briquettes High
42 Vegetable oils and fats High t=25%
51 Organic chemicals High
56 Fertilisers, manufactured High
59 Chemical materials and products High
61 Leather, leather manufactures High
63 Cork and wood manufactures (excluding
furniture)
High
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles,
related products
Very high t=11%
67 Iron and steel High
68 Non-ferrous metals High
69 Manufactures of metal High
                                               
ƒ An empty cell does not necessarily imply that tariffs are zero. A blank stands for very low tariffs.
According to WTO's Trade Policy Review of the EU (2000) EU's average tariff for non-agricultural
goods stood at 4.2% in 1999.16
75 Office machines&automatic data... High
76 Telecommunications&sound High
78 Road vehicles High
83 Travel goods, handbags High
84 Articles of apparel, clothing acc. High
85 Footwear High
4.3 MERCOSUR's most important export sectors and EU trade protectionism
After having identified the sectors most affected by EU protectionism in Section 4.2, it
must be clarified whether these sectors are of relevance in MERCOSUR's export
trade and for MERCOSUR's economic development. Important export sectors are the
ones that are large (they dispose of a high export share) and/or the ones that are
characterised by high annual growth rates. Export shares and growth rates in tables,
5, 6 and 7 follow own calculations. In order to avoid swings that distort the picture,
averages are computed for the period of 1988/89 to 1996. The following two tables
contain an overview over the eight most dynamic or fastest growing sectors (Table 5)
and the eight biggest export sectors (Table 6) in the MERCOSUR countries
16.
However, caution when interpreting the figures must be taken: A sector with a high
export share can be considered as a sector with relative national importance and with
relative competitive strength. This strength might be the result of a favourable
resource endowment and might therefore be an indicator of comparative advantage
(in the absence of policy). However, strength might well follow from the rational build-
up of competitive strength by means of a whole set of policies (devaluation policy,
industrial and technology policy, regional policy etc.). Interpretations of dynamic
growth must be carefully done for similar reasons. Sector-specific industrial and
technological policies might be the cause of above-average growth. But, a very low
starting level might be another cause of above-average growth rates.
                                               
16 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.17
Table 5: MERCOSUR's fastest growing exporting sectors and their contribution
to total exports (1988/9-96)






32 Coal, coke and briquettes 97.06% 0.01% high
81 Sanitary, plumbing,... 61.94% 0.01% low
33 Petroleum, petroleum products 60.44% 0.46% low
23 Crude rubber 53.47% 0.07% low
73 Metal working machinery 44.38% 0.13% low
82 Furniture and parts thereof 40.07% 0.47% low
57 Explosives and pyrotechnic prod. 38.16% 0.00% low
11 Beverages 35.94% 0.28% high
Table 5 shows that the most dynamic sectors have very low export shares, all of
them lying between 0 and 1 per cent. It also indicates that low protection from the
side of the EU helps fast growing exports. The fastest growing sectors are in general
of non-agricultural origin. This finding is supported by a study that revealed the
increasing importance of Linder products
17 in relation to Heckscher-Ohlin products
18
in MERCOSUR exports to the EU in the period of 1988 to 1996 (Martínez-Zarzoso
and Nowak-Lehmann D. , 2002).
Now, attention is devoted to MERCOSUR sectors with the highest export shares
(Table 6). The majority of the large sectors is to be found in the categories
'agriculture, forestry, fishery', 'textiles' and 'metals' that are subject to high or even
very high protection from the side of the EU. They belong to the category of
Heckscher-Ohlin products whose trade is explained by differentials in the resource
endowment (labour, capital, human capital, natural resources). Traditional trade
theory would assume a comparative advantage for the products in Table 6. Strategic
trade policy or exchange rate management, in contrast, do not seem to be the causal
factors of the observed export strength.
                                               
17 Trade of Linder products is favoured by similar levels of development (income levels) of trading
partners.
18 Trade of H-O products is determined by different factor endowments of trading partners.18
However, it is quite difficult to evaluate the growth performance of these sectors.
From Table 7 it becomes clear that the average annual growth rates in the
categories: 'very high', 'high' and 'low' EU-protection are significantly different. The
average growth rate of the low protection sectors amounts to 17.09 per cent,
whereas the growth rates of high and very high protection sectors stand at 7.10 and
2.65 per cent respectively. It has to be borne in mind that these figures are not
weighted by export shares, but they still shed light on the broad picture.
Table 6: MERCOSUR's biggest sectors and their dynamics (1988/9-1996)





08 feeding stuff for animals 14.40% 1.17% high
05 vegetables and fruit 8.98% 4.47% very high
28 metalliferrous ores ... 8.96% 9.67% low
68 non-ferrous metals 8.08% 1.13% high
22 oil seeds and oleaginous fruit 7.63% -0.87% high
02 dairy products 5.99% 0.94% very high
61 leather, leather manufactures 2.71% 8.34% high
03 fish, crustaceans, molluscs 2.56% 4.79 high
Table 7: MERCOSUR's export growth rates in different categories of protection











Live animals chiefly for food
Meat and meat preparations
Dairy products and birds' eggs
Cereals and cereal preparations
Vegetables and fruit
Sugar, sugar preparations and honey
Miscellaneous edible products
Textile fibres and their wastes










'High protection' sectors (23 sectors) growth rate:
7.10 (unweighted)























Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices
Feeding stuff for animals
Beverages
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit
Pulp and waste paper
Coal, coke and briquettes
Fixed vegetable oils and fats
Organic chemicals
Fertilisers, manufactured
Chemical materials and products
Leather, leather manufactures
Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture)




Office machines&automatic data processing
Telecommunications&sound recording apparatus
Road vehicles
Travel goods, handbags and similar containers











































Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
Hides, skins and furskins
Crude rubber
Cork and wood
Crude fertilisers and crude materials
Metalliferrous ores and metal scrap
Crude animal and vegetable materials
Petroleum, petroleum products
Animal oils and fats
Animal-vegetable oils-fats, processed...
Inorganic chemicals
Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
Essential oils&perfume materials
Explosives and pyrotechnic products





































Power generating machinery and equipment





Sanitary, plumbing, heating+lighting fixtures
Furniture and parts thereof
Professional, scientific&controlling instruments
Photographic apparatus, optical goods, ...
Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Postal packages not classified accord. to kind
Special transactions not classified accord. to ..
Animals, live, zoo animals, dogs, cats




















The ex-post analysis for the period of 1988 to 1996 revealed three things: First, a
more competitive real exchange rate could improve MERCOSUR's export
performance. Second, EU protection has had in general a very negative impact on
MERCOSUR export growth rates. The most dynamic sectors were on average
characterised by low EU-protection. 'Low protection sectors' grew much faster than
'high protection sectors', and 'very high protection sectors' grew the most slowly.
Third, EU protection strongly affected MERCOSUR sectors with the highest export
shares. These were basically the sectors with a comparative advantage where a
favourable resource endowment can be observed. These sectors are not only crucial
for GDP growth, but are also the main suppliers of foreign exchange.
From today's point of view the question is whether EU protection has changed
significantly since 1996 due to the Uruguay Round agreements and in which areas
some progress has become visible. The answer might be found in several articles of
Finger (2001a,b,c,d), Finger and Nogués (2001), Adhikari (2002) who take a close
look at the Uruguay Round outcome and in the latest WTO Trade Policy Review of
the EU (2000). The Uruguay Round commitment contained five important points:21
1) All non-tariff measures (NTM) should be eliminated and replaced by tariffs (i.e.
tariffication).
2) Tariffs should be reduced: industrial countries should reduce import tariffs by an
average of 36 percent over six years, developing countries should reduce their
tariffs by 24 percent over ten years.
3) Export subsidies and domestic support should be reduced in a parallel way by
the same percentages.
4) All textiles and clothing products should be integrated into GATT in four stages
(first day of calendar years 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005), encompassing 16
percent, 17 percent, 18 percent and 49 percent (by 1990 volume) of all specified
textiles and clothing products.
5) New domestic regulations in areas such as services and intellectual property
should be adopted in the LDCs.
As Finger and Nogués (2001) point out the 1
st point of these negotiation outcomes
was written into the agreement as a legal obligation, but the 2
nd and 3
rd points were
not, thus creating a considerable amount of slippage. This view is confirmed by
WTO's Trade Policy Review on the EU of 2000, which admits that the EU was
implementing the Uruguay Round commitments on schedule
19, although the extent of
actual trade liberalisation must be judged as modest. Today's external trade regime
of the EU continues to contain many trade impediments and has the following
features:
• The EU has a largely open market for non-agricultural products, with an average
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff of 4.2% in 1999. In addition, the EU removed six
quantitative restrictions under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, notably
Germany's restriction on coal (in place since 1958). Anti-dumping measures are in
place on imports of iron and steel products, electronic products, and chemical
products from a number of origins. State aid undermines conditions of competition in
parts of the manufacturing sector.
• Conditions of access on agricultural products are affected in the EU by the
operation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). High levels of self-sufficiency
apply to primary agricultural products, such as wheat, dairy products, and meat. The
simple average tariff on agricultural products is estimated at 17.3%, although access
                                               
19 The implementation period runs from July 1995 to July 2000.22
on high-tariff items mainly takes place through tariff quotas. The duty system is rather
complex. Duties are assessed on specific terms, on the basis of ingredients or the
season (e.g. vegetables and fruit), or based on the entry price. As a result, more
open conditions of access generally apply to items not produced in the EU (e.g.
coffee, cocoa).
• In addition to border measures, the Community spent Euro 45 billion (US$ 50
billion) on the CAP in 1999, making agriculture - at 45% of the budget - the most
visible item of Community expenditure. Direct payments (which are subject to
production-limiting programs) have risen in importance to account for about one-
quarter of the total.
• Market access conditions, via product regulations and standards, for exporters of
foodstuffs are likely to be affected by the EU's policy of greater food safety in the
future.
• Textiles and clothing is a category of imports subject to above-average tariffs, tariff
escalation
20, and quotas. The EU maintains quotas under the WTO Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which were carried over from the long-standing Multi-
Fibre Arrangement. Growth rates were increased by 16% on 1 January 1995 and by
25% on 1 January 1998; higher growth rates have applied to small suppliers. The
careful wording of the agreement has allowed the industrial countries to put off much
of market liberalisation until the very end of the transition period, until 2005. Through
the first two stages the EU has only eliminated seven percent of its restrictions
(Finger and Nogués, 2001).
• In the services sector the EU is committed to continue removing restrictions to
competition and trade. However, among subsectors, the pace of liberalisation differs
significantly.
Against these quite meagre Uruguay Round achievements, trade ministers from
around the world gathered in Doha on the Persian Gulf for a WTO meeting in
November 2001. The objective was to agree, for both DCs and LDCs, an acceptable
agenda for international trade talks. Whereas the Quad countries (the EU, US,
Canada, Japan) wanted new issues to be discussed (investment, competition,
transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, further reductions in
industrial goods), LDCs asked for existing agreements (e.g. Uruguay Round Agree-
                                               
20 The tariff increases with the degree of processing.23
ments) with their promises for agricultural goods and textiles and clothing to be
thoroughly reviewed, before any discussions are opened on any further issues. There
are provisions for reviews in many of the existing agreements but so far none have
been carried out (Christian Aid, 2001).
To conclude, the following proposals can be made against the background of actual
outcomes of the Uruguay Round and some findings in Section 3:
• Some kind of exchange rate management seems to be advisable for the
MERCOSUR countries. A permanent appreciation of the real exchange rate should
be avoided. This would help export growth to some extent, depending on the specific
exchange rate elasticities.
• The old Uruguay Round agreements from 1994 which contained several
improvement for LDCs in general and the MERCOSUR countries specifically, as
exporters of agricultural products and textiles/clothing, should be reviewed with rigour
and placed on the 'after Doha' agenda again.
• Trade talks between the MERCOSUR and the EU should be pursued, but seen
from a realistic perspective. A Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the
MERCOSUR that also includes sensitive goods (such as agriculture and
textiles/clothing) will be difficult to reach given the experience from the last 9 years.
EU concessions will depend on new regulations for services and intellectual property
rights from the side of MERCOSUR. These concessions might be very costly
21 for
these countries.
                                               
21 See remarks of Finger and Nogués, 2001e.24
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